Egress
Every create compiles a network policy from three layers, strictest first:- The platform floor, which no setting can open: private and internal ranges (
10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16,100.64.0.0/10, loopback, link-local including the cloud metadata address169.254.169.254, multicast and reserved ranges, and their IPv6 equivalents), names such aslocalhost,*.localand*.internal, and the mail and DNS-over-TLS ports 25, 465, 587, 2525 and 853. Those ports are blocked for TCP and UDP to every destination, and the packets are dropped rather than refused, so a connection attempt to one of them times out. - Your plan’s limits. Paid plans allow the public internet by default; the free plan allows no public egress for now. Coming soon: Free egress on, capped at its included 5 GB a month (see limits).
- The sandbox’s own policy: the E2B fields below on create, else your team’s egress settings (see Which policy applies).
- A destination inside the platform floor is refused with
400, and so is a host name that resolves into it (this blocks DNS-rebinding tricks). - Host names in
allow_outneed public egress off (deny_out: ["0.0.0.0/0"]orallow_internet_access=false), as on E2B. Wildcard names and names that do not resolve are refused for now. deny_outtakes IPv4 addresses and CIDRs only.- Unknown keys inside
networkare refused, so a typo cannot silently drop part of a policy. - Per plan: up to 512 allow entries and 1,024 deny entries on paid plans (64 and 256 on the free plan), and at most 10 DNS servers.
- On the free plan, which has no public egress,
allow_outopens particular hosts, not the internet: an IP range there can be at most a/24, and the addresses and ranges together can cover at most 1,024 addresses. Host names are not limited by this. A policy over either limit is refused with400.
Which policy applies
A new sandbox gets the first of these that exists, then the platform floor and your plan’s limits on top:- The
networkandallow_internet_accessfields of its create request. - Its template’s policy (built-in templates have none).
- Your organization’s team egress settings: set them on the dashboard’s Network page (owners and admins), or with
PUT /v1/network. - Your plan’s default.
effective_policy.sh
Change a running sandbox
update_network replaces a running sandbox’s policy. It goes through the same floor and limits as a create. An update that does not mention allow_internet_access keeps the sandbox’s current setting.
sandboxes:use (and the sandbox on its list, if it has one), or a dashboard member or above.
Credentials without exposing them
The credential vault keeps API tokens out of sandboxes. Store a secret, with the hosts it may be sent to, on the dashboard’s Credential vault page (owners and admins) or withanona-compute vault create. Then name it in a header rule for one host; creating a sandbox with a new rule takes the permission in Bindings and who can make them. The egress proxy adds the header to the sandbox’s HTTPS requests to that host; the sandbox, its environment and its disk never contain the value.
- A header value must be exactly one
${vault.<name>}, optionally afterBearerorBasic. A literal value is refused with400, so no credential ends up in a policy. So is a rule with an emptyheadersobject. - Each rule names one exact host. A wildcard such as
*.example.comis refused with400. - Proxies cache a value for up to 60 seconds, so a rotation or revocation reaches running sandboxes within a minute.
- The same rules work in the team egress settings, so every new sandbox gets them.
- Secret names start with a lowercase letter, then lowercase letters, digits and
_, up to 63 characters in all; values up to 8 KiB.
vault_cli.sh
vault get: no response from the API carries a value, so the CLI has nothing to print.
The vault is included in every plan at no charge.
Allowed hosts
Every secret records the hosts it may be sent to. You set them when you store it (--host on the CLI, allowedHosts in the API), and replace them with anona-compute vault allowed-hosts or PUT /v1/vault/secrets/{name}/allowed-hosts. An entry is one of:
- an exact host:
api.github.comcovers that host only; *.and a domain:*.github.comcovers every host undergithub.com, but notgithub.comitself. So*.httpbin.orgdoes not coverhttpbin.org; list both if you need both;*on its own, for any host.
400. A rule that sends the secret to a host outside the list is refused with 403. Narrowing the list also stops existing bindings to hosts it no longer covers. Without the list, anyone who can write a rule could point your credential at a server they control.
Bindings and who can make them
A rule needs a binding: a record that this secret goes to this host in this header. The vault page andanona-compute vault list show every binding, and each can be revoked.
- A rule in a sandbox’s create request, or in a network update, is bound for that sandbox alone. Two sandboxes with the same secret, host and header have two bindings, each listed with scope
sandboxand its sandbox ID. - A rule in the team egress settings or a template’s policy is bound once, when the settings are saved, and every sandbox under them uses that binding.
- A sandbox’s own bindings are revoked when the sandbox ends (deleted, timed out or failed), so they drop out of the list. A paused sandbox keeps its bindings, because it can resume. Team and template bindings stay until you revoke them or delete the secret.
anona-compute login. So does an API key with the vault:bind scope that is not limited to specific sandboxes, and an unrestricted API key (no scopes and no sandbox list, see API keys). No preset has vault:bind, not even Full access: pick it in a custom key.
Anyone else who can create sandboxes can still use the rules in the team egress settings and templates, because those bindings exist already. Any other rule in their create request or network update is refused with 403, even when another sandbox has the same rule: a sandbox’s binding is not shared.
How it works
For a host with a vault rule, the egress proxy ends the sandbox’s TLS connection and opens its own to the host, which it verifies. So the sandbox sees a certificate for that host issued by the egress proxy’s certificate authority, valid for about 7 days. That certificate authority is in the sandbox’s system bundle,/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt, and SSL_CERT_FILE, REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE, CURL_CA_BUNDLE and NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS (also PIP_CERT and GIT_SSL_CAINFO) point at that file. curl, Python’s default SSL context and Node accept the certificate.
A client with its own certificate store fails the handshake with a certificate error: Python with certifi’s bundle passed explicitly, a Java keystore, or a pinned certificate. Point it at /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt, or call the host from a client that uses the system bundle.
Each rule shows "audit": "metadata" in the sandbox’s compiled policy. For every request it matches, the egress proxy records the time, method, host, path, response status and size, the rule, and the names of the headers it added. It does not record request or response bodies.
Ingress
All traffic to a sandbox goes through the Anona gateway athttps://<port>-<sandbox id>.sbx.compute.anonalabs.com:
Single ports can also be made public, or shared with signed, expiring links; see Preview links. Sandbox URLs live on their own domain, so content served from a sandbox never shares cookies with the API or the dashboard.
DNS
Sandboxes resolve names through public resolvers (1.1.1.1 and 1.0.0.1), so they cannot resolve names inside Anona’s network. Both are always allowed, whatever the policy. A policy’sdnsServers does not change them: another address listed there is only allowed as a destination, when allow_out has a host name and public egress is off. The free plan accepts only these two.