- The credential vault stores the token. The egress proxy adds it as a header to HTTPS requests for one named host. It never enters the sandbox: not its environment, not its disk.
- An egress policy turns public internet off and allows only the hosts the agent needs.
1
Store the token once
On the dashboard’s Credential vault page, or from the CLI. Name every host the secret may ever be sent to; a rule aimed anywhere else is refused with
403.store_token.sh
2
Create the sandbox locked to that host
locked_sandbox.py
curl https://api.github.com/user arrives authenticated, and curl https://example.com does not connect.3
Give the agent a key that cannot widen this
Run the agent with an API key that has no
vault:bind scope (no preset has it). It can still create sandboxes under rules you saved in the team egress settings, but any new rule it writes is refused with 403, so it cannot aim your token at a host of its choosing.4
Rotate or revoke
anona-compute vault rotate github_token --value-file new-token.txt reaches running sandboxes within a minute. Ending a sandbox revokes its own bindings.The proxy terminates TLS for hosts with a rule, using a certificate authority that is already in the sandbox’s system bundle. Clients with their own trust store (a Java keystore, certifi passed explicitly, a pinned certificate) need pointing at
/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt. See How it works.examples/python/vault_locked_sandbox.py in the public SDK repository. It prints what happens at each step.